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Introduction 
That prices of farm commodities are more volatile than prices in other sectors is generally accepted.  
The usual argument relates inelastic farm-gate demand to shocks in supply due to biological and 
climatic factors.  This paper employs a simple model of farm-to-retail price determination in order to 
examine the extent to which monopoly power in the food manufacturing sector may also affect price 
instability.  The issue is investigated through successive applications to Turkish agriculture.  These 
applications are interesting for three reasons.  First, food-manufacturing in Turkey is highly 
concentrated, with levels of agglomeration in many marketing channels similar to those of the beef 
sector in the United States.  Second, recent contributions using VAR techniques (eg., Orden and 
Fackler (1989), Robertson and Orden (1990), Dorfman and Lastrapes (1996)), have focused on 
developed-economy agriculture.  The Turkish economy, with greater macroeconomic and trade 
instabilities, provides an important contrast with these studies.  Third, argument that monopoly in 
processing may exacerbate price instability has received scant attention in the literature.  Here, we 
argue, this hypothesis provides an appealing explanation of observed volatilities in commodity 
prices. 
1. Conventional Wisdom  
The main ideas that underlie conventional wisdom are articulated in the following quotation 
(Robertson and Orden, 1990, p.161):  
 
 “At issue are whether levels of agricultural and non-agricultural prices respond 
proportionally to changes in the level of the money supply and whether there are predictable 
deviations from such neutrality in the short run.  An important hypothesis concerning these issues is 
that agriculture is a competitive sector in which prices are more flexible than those in non-
agricultural (fix-price) sectors.  Under this hypothesis, it has been argued that expansionary monetary 
policy [interpret as ‘demand shocks’] favors agriculture and may cause short-run agricultural prices 
to over-shoot their long-run equilibrium levels, while contractionary monetary policy [interpret as 
‘supply shocks’] shifts relative prices against agriculture.” 
 
The justifications for interpreting expansionary policies as demand shocks and contractionary ones as 
supply shocks are twofold.   First, expansionary policies that lead to hyperinflations of the type 
encountered in Turkey are likely to have their initial impacts on high-velocity markets.  These 
markets are characterized by demand-side atomism and a high rate of repeat purchases.  Second, 
contractionary policies that restrict access to capital markets, retard entry and exit from farming and 
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impede adjustment efficiencies are likely to have had initial impact on supply-side agents.  We argue 
that in vertical farm-to-retail systems the former is best interpreted as a demand-side effect and the 
latter a supply-side effect.  The substantive issue that we examine is whether competition mitigates or 
amplifies the impacts of these effects on farm prices.  
2. VAR evidence from the Turkish wheat sector  
In a set of vector autoregressive (VAR) experiments, with the VAR’s applied to time series (1988:1-
1996:12) on each of five constituent wheat-derivative products (flour, bread, pasta, bulgur and 
cookies), we consider the impacts of a one-standard-error increase in the consumer price index (CPI) 
within the vertical wheat-marketing channel.  In all but one case, (bread) the impulses are 
monotonically increasing in the shock.  In general, when measured relative to their means, the shocks 
are considerably larger in the farm sector.  Specifically, by combining the variation in the impulse-
response projections (σ) with the corresponding mean adjustments (µ), we compute that the 
coefficients of variation (σ ÷ µ) for the downstream commodities flour, bread, pasta, bulgur and 
cookies are, respectively, 0.48, 0.27, 0.38, 0.43, 0.51.  The corresponding coefficient of variation for 
the farm-gate commodity, which is wheat, is 0.67.  The question we ask, specifically with reference 
to the farm price, is whether these responses would be greater under more competitive conditions.  
Criticisms of VAR are well-documented (see, for example, Darnell and Evans (1990) and the 
literature cited therein).  Among the major criticisms is the lack of an (economic) theoretic basis for 
the estimating equations.  This limitation is important in the current context. Accordingly, we 
develop a simple simultaneous-equations model.  
3. A simple explanation  
The ‘Robertson-Orden hypothesis’ (that competition leads to greater volatilities in farm-price 
movements) can be substantiated with monopoly as basis, in the following, simplified way.  Let i, i = 
1, 2, .., N, index processors and consider production of a food product, yi, from combining a farm 
commodity, xi, with another variable input, zi, in the technology, yi = min{xi,zi}.  Demand is p = A-
aY; supply is w = B+bX; Y = Σiyi and X = Σixi;  each of the parameters A, a, B and b, is positive; 
and, because technology is ‘fixed proportions,’ we set yi = xi = zi.  Consequently, we focus on the 
farm-to-retail part of profits.  Processors maximize pi(yi) = (A-aΣiyi) yi - (B+bΣiyi) yi, and the 
corresponding first-order conditions yield, at the symmetric, Nash equilibrium, Y = N(A-
B)/(N+1)(a+b).  Substituting for output in the commodity-supply relation yields comparative statics 
with respect to two effects, namely, a demand shock, ∆A>0 and a supply shock ∆B>0.  In particular, 
∂w/∂A = Nb/(N+1)(a+b) and ∂w/∂B = 1-Nb/(N+1)(a+b).  Both effects are positive, but, whereas the 
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first effect is increasing in N, the second declines.  Thus, interpreting N as ‘the degree of competition 
present within the market.’ we obtain a basis for the hypothesis, that demand-side shocks to farm 
price are greater the greater is the degree of competition. 
4. Reduced-Form, Farm-to-Retail Linkages  
Consider, now, the full reduced form that generates these comparative statics.  From the structural 
equations underlying the equilibrium, the reduced-form linkages are  
(1)   y = z ϑ, 
where y ≡ (p,w), z ≡ (A, B), and ϑ, the matrix of reduced-form coefficients, is  
(2)  ϑ ≡ π ππ π, 
where pi11 ≡ 1  	


	, pi12 ≡ 

	


	, pi21 ≡ 


	


	, and  pi22 ≡ 1 


	


	.  The coefficients pi11 and pi12 
denote the impacts of demand and supply shocks on retail price, while pi21 and pi22 denote their impacts on 
farm price.  A pattern emerges when the within-industry effects (retail-to-retail and farm-to-farm) are 
compared with the cross-industry effects (retail-to-farm and farm-to-retail).  Increased competition, here 
exemplified by a larger value of parameter N, dampens the impact of the direct effects (retail-to-retail and 
farm-to-farm), but amplifies the magnitude of the indirect effects (retail-to-farm and farm-to-retail).  The 
parameter definitions that generate these results are important for two additional reasons.  First, a useful 
pair of within-equation restrictions, pi11 + pi12 = 1 and pi21 + pi22 = 1, can be used to improve precision of 
estimation.  Second, a set of cross-equation relations that follows from the parameter definitions plays a 
key role in subsequent analysis.  These cross-equation relations are: 
   
  pi11 + pi12 = 

	’ 
  pi22 - pi12 = 

	’ 
Lemma: pi11 - pi21 + pi22 - pi12 = 

	’ 
  |ϑ| ≡ pi11 pi22 - pi21 pi12 = 	. 
 
To the extent that equation (1) can be estimated given data on p, w, A and B; these definitions prove 
potentially useful estimators of the numbers of firms in the marketing channel.  They are, thus, central to 
the exercise. 
5. Dynamic perspectives on the comparative statics 
Analyses of volatility is incomplete without reference to dynamic adjustments.  Lagged responses in 
commodity supply motivate concerns about adjustments in the farm sector, but the potential dynamic 
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effects at the consumption level are less clear.  Nevertheless, own consumption by farmers and, with 
it, storage and inter-seasonal linkages are likely important in developing countries.  We therefore 
consider price-lagged specifications of demand and supply equations and leave the matter of their 
significance to the empirics that follow.  In this respect, and with the aid of a little algebra, the 
comparative-static results of the previous section can be given a dynamic interpretation.  Consider 
the specifications of the exogenous variables A and B,  
(3)  A ≡ αo + ∑ αz   α p, 
(4)  B ≡ βo + ∑ αβz   β w; 
where the α’s and β’s are parameters of indeterminate sign; the z’s denote relevant, contemporaneous 
demand shifters; pt-1 and wt-1 denote lagged realizations of the endogenous variables; and α and β 
denote their respective, initial impacts.  Importantly, the values α and β cannot be constrained based 
on any theoretical basis and, ultimately, remain an empirical matter.  However, like the parameters in 
the lemma, they play an important role in subsequent analysis.  At points in the discussion it will 
prove useful, for pedagogic reasons, to normalize the parameters α and β, both, at one.  In this case 
the reader should keep in mind that the one-step-ahead impacts of changes in the lagged prices are 
the same as those derived above, with respect to shifts in A and B.  Turning to these dynamic impacts 
and following a standard treatment (see, for example, Greene, 1993, pp. 619-25), the reduced-form 
for the two prices is  
(5)   yt = zt Ψ + yt-1 ∆ + vt,   t = 1, 2, T; 
where yt ≡ (pt, wt) denotes contemporaneous observations on the endogenous variables; zt ≡ (zd1t, .., 
zdDt, zs1t, .., zsSt) denotes observations on the demand and supply shifters; yt-1 ≡ (pt-1, wt-1) denotes 
lagged observations on the endogenous variables; Ψ denotes the instantaneous impacts of changes in 
the components of z; and the coefficient matrix of the lagged effects, 
(6)  ∆ ≡ ∆ ∆∆ ∆, 
is related to the matrix ϑ in (2) by the condition 
(7)  ∆ ≡ E ϑ, 
where E is a (2×2) matrix with parameters α and β on the diagonal, and zeros elsewhere.  Thus, with 
α and β normalized, E becomes the identity matrix and ∆ reduces to ϑ.  We are interested in dynamic 
responses to exogenous shocks, whether the model is stable, and the pattern of adjustments to a stable 
equilibrium if, indeed, one exists.  We are also interested in the extent to which competition affects any of 
these characteristics.  The dynamic multipliers, stability conditions and adjustment paths depend crucially 
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on the elements of the matrix ∆.  Thus, in characterizing these effects we will make use of the equality in 
(7) and, specifically, the relations below, which follow from combining the lemma with equation (7),  
  θ1 ≡ ∆11 - ∆21 = 
α
	, 
  θ2 ≡ ∆22 - ∆12 = 
β
	, 
(8)  θ3 ≡ ∆11 - ∆21 + ∆22 - ∆12 = α	β	, 
  θ4 ≡ |∆| ≡ ∆11 ∆22 - ∆12 ∆21 = αβ	. 
Except for the presence of the terms α and β, these conditions are identical to those of the lemma.  As 
such, they do not yield any additional insights; but when combined in a particular fashion, they do.  
Specifically, combining the first, second and fourth relations in (8), we have  
  θ5 ≡ 
 !
 " = α, 
(9)  θ6 ≡  ! # = β; 
and, combining, in turn, these two relations with the four in (8), we have 
  θ7 ≡ 
 $
 # -1 = N, 
  θ8 ≡ 
 %
 " -1 = N, 
 (10)   θ9 ≡  $	 % &  -1 = N, 
  θ10 ≡ 
 $ %
 !  -1 = N. 
It is worth noting that each of the restrictions in (10) yields identical estimates of N.  But we have yet to 
draw a relationship between N and the dynamic impacts of the shocks.  The short-run effects of changes 
in the exogenous variables are contained within the coefficients of the matrix Ψ.  They are discussed 
above.   From (5), the dynamic, cumulative, and long-run multipliers are, respectively, µt ≡ Ψ∆t, 
∑ '() * ∑ Ψ∆() , and ∑ '+) *  Ψ,-  ∆..  They are void of analytical results.  Thus, we turn to 
the relationship between competition and the stability conditions.  Let λi, i = 1, 2, .., M, denote the roots 
of the characteristic equation, |∆-λI| = 0.  Stability requires |λi| ≤ 1 for all i = 1,. 2, .., M.  Real-valued λi > 
0 (λi < 0) add damped exponential (saw-tooth) terms, whereas λi complex adds a sinusoidal term.  The 
roots solve λ2+δ1λ+δ2 = 0, where δ1 ≡ (∆11+∆22) = trace (∆) and δ2 ≡ ∆11∆22 - ∆12∆21 = |∆|.  Clearly, the 
question of whether ∆ converges depends crucially on the parameters α and β.  Inevitably, this question 
can only be resolved empirically.  However, momentarily fix α and β at one.  In terms of (7), E reverts to 
the identity matrix and ∆ = ϑ, permitting us to focus on the parameter definitions below (2).  Signing the 
roots and examining their magnitude is now a simple matter of employing two standard results (see, for 
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example, Chiang, 1984, p. 505-506), namely λ1λ2 = |ϑ| and λ1+λ2 = trace(ϑ).  Making use of the 
definitions below (2), and the fourth line of the lemma; we have the two conditions 
(11)   λ1λ2 = 	 > 0, 
(12)  λ1+λ2 = 		  ∈ [1, 3/2]. 
Thus, both roots have the same sign and must sum to a positive number.  Therefore, they are both 
positive.  The radical in the solutions, trace(ϑ)2-4|ϑ| = (∆11+∆22)2-4(∆11∆22-∆12∆21) is positive, so 
sinusoidal effects are ruled out.  Thus, the time path offers either dampened or explosive exponential 
terms, and depends on the dominant root.  It may be greater than one, but from (12), in the limit as N gets 
large, both roots are fractional.  It follows, accordingly, that for small N, a window of opportunity for 
instability exists, and it vanishes as the degree of competition rises.  Specifically, and in contrast to the 
Robertson-Orden prediction, competition may induce stability.  That is, the greater the degree of 
competition, the less likely are price explosions.  That these results depend on assumptions (viz., α = β = 
1), which may be invalid, generates scope for empirical enquiry. 
6. Empirical evidence   
We seek to identify the magnitude of responses to shocks in the marketing system and identify a 
correspondence between it and the number of firms.  The coherent Bayes solution is to parameterize the 
structural system over N and derive conditional distributions of the dynamic multipliers, whereupon the 
effect of N is easily established.  Arranging the observations on the variables yt, zt and yt-1, we can rewrite 
equation (5) as 
(13)  Y = Z D + V, 
where Y(T×M) are T observations on yt; Z(T×K) are T observations on the M components of yt-1 and the L 
components of zt; and V(T×M) is a matrix of error terms assumed to be distributed N(0,Σ⊗I), where 0(T×M) 
is a null matrix, I(T×T) is the T-dimensional identity matrix, and Σ(M×M) specifies covariance among the 
columns of V.  Because the posterior distributions have well-known forms, they lend themselves readily 
to investigation through resampling techniques.  Our approach is to work exclusively through equations 
(8), (9) and (10); obtain estimates of α and β and N and, then, conditional on the estimates of α and β, 
obtain a sequence of estimates for the dynamic multipliers from the sequence of posterior distributions 
conditioned by chosen values of N.  We do this by resampling from the coefficient matrix of the reduced 
form.  Specifically, let {Σ(s), s = 1, 2, .., S} and {D(s), s = 1, 2, .., S} denote a sequence of draws from the 
posteriors corresponding to (13), where the draws in the second sequence are conditioned by the ones in 
the first.  Then, from the draws on the coefficient matrix, we can extract estimates of the restrictions in 
equations (8), {θi(s), s = 1, 2, .., S; i = 1, 2, 3, 4}; (9) {θi(s), s = 1, 2, .., S; i = 5, 6}; and (10), {θi(s), s = 1, 2, 
.., S; i = 7, 8, 9, 10}; plot posterior distributions for α, β and N; compute their means 
8 
 
  α/  = ∑ θ1
,. , 
(14)  β2  = ∑ θ3
,. , 
  N5  = ∑

6∑ θ
,.)7 , 
 and then derive conditional estimates of the dynamic multipliers of farm- and retail-price responses in 
relation to a change in the CPI.  Unfortunately, space limits the presentation to just one of the groups. 
 Figure 1 reports results for the estimations of the parameters α, β and N for the flour-milling 
sector.  The figure reports distributions based on a Gibbs samples of size S = 100,000.  As can be 
observed from the figure, both α (the distribution shaded in blue) and β (the distribution shaded in 
green) have well defined distributions over a narrow range, with means of 0.81 and 0.89, 
respectively.   The distribution for N (the distribution shaded in brown), however, is less well defined 
and has negative components.   
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Posterior distributions of parameters: α (blue), β (green) and N (brown).  
Source: Authors’ estimation results. 
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Figure 2 reports the corresponding estimates of the retail-product multipliers derived for the twenty-
period-ahead predictions.  The multipliers are derived in response to a CPI shock on retail and farm 
prices.  The distribution shaded in blue reports estimates of the retail-product multipliers when the 
numbers of firms, N, is left unconstrained; the distribution shaded in green reports results when N is 
constrained to be equal to one; and the distribution shaded in brown reports results when N is 
constrained to equal one hundred.   
 
 
Fig. 2. Retail multipliers, twenty-steps-ahead posterior predictions: unconstrained 
(green), N=1 constrained (blue) and N=100 constrained (brown).  Source: Authors’ 
estimation results. 
 
Figure 3 reports similar information, but this time with respect to the farm-gate multipliers in 
response to the CPI shock.  With reference to the retail price reports (figure 2), the effect of 
constraining N is to lower, slightly, the magnitude of the multipliers, but then increase them 
substantially such that, for N=100, the market becomes unstable.  With reference to the farm price 
reports (figure 3), increasing N leads to increasing but convergent effects, beyond which, at some N 
< 100, explosion occurs. 
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Fig. 3. Retail multipliers, twenty-steps-ahead posterior predictions: unconstrained 
(green), N=1 constrained (blue) and N=100 constrained (brown).  Source: Authors’ 
estimation results. 
 
Thus, the effect of competition seems on the one hand to contradict the results of the dynamic SEM, 
but  substantiate the notion espoused by Robertson and Orden, namely that competition leads to  
volatility. Space limitations prevent reporting results for the remaining sectors but, briefly,  
can be summarized as follows. Bread: Competition raises the initial impact of the  
shocks but lowers the length of their inter-temporal effects, and generates stable equilibria.  
Pasta: Competition is once again stable, leads to larger initial impacts and shortened duration  
of effect. Bulgur: Competition leads to stable equilibria and lengthened duration of effect.  
Cookies: Competition leads to instabilities.  
7. Conclusions and Extensions  
Empirical evidence in support of the ‘competition-breeds-volatility’ hypothesis is mixed. In  
two cases (flour and cookies) it appears to be confirmed.  The remaining examples seem to  
conform to an alternative thesis derived from a two-equation, dynamic simultaneous-equations 
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model.  This thesis is that competition enhances the likelihood of stable price movements.  More 
work is needed before any firm conclusions can be drawn, and the results thus far are subject to a 
number of limitations.  The, most notable of these is the assumption of constant variance.  Plots of 
residuals based on posterior means suggest that there are at least two, possibly three, distinct regimes 
within the time series. Consequently, work continues along the lines of a recent contribution to 
mixed-density estimation (Lavine and West, 1992).  
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